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This study examines the relationship between ownership concentration and the extent of financial 
ratio disclosures (EFRD) in the 2007 annual reports of Australian IistedJirms. Using agency theory 
as theoretical background, it is suggested thatjrms with more concentrated ownership structures are 
less likely to provide voluntary disclosure of Jinancial ratios information. The univariate tests 
demonstrate that profitable jrms,  those firms audited by Big4 auditors and firms belonging to 
Jinancial services industry communicate moreJinancia1 ratio information. OLS regressions show that 
more dispersed shareholdingJirms' are signzjkantly associated with EFRD. ProJitable and larger 
Jirms audited by independent and Big4 audit Jirms additionally reported more extensive jinancial 
ratio information. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of ownership structure on the extent of 
financial ratio disclosures within the annual reports of ASX listed firms. The annual reports 
of 300 firms listed on Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) are gathered and analysed. The 
objective is to derive insights on the reporting practices of financial ratios by Australian 
companies. Communication of information such as financial ratios enhances the 
understanding of the financial statements of potential investors. Financial ratios enable these 
investors to make more informed investment decisions. 
A financial ratio disclosure index is developed based on past literature (Horngren et al. 2006; 
Mitchell 2006; Morton and Harrison 2009; Peirson and Ramsay 2000; Stickney et al. 2004; 
Subramanyam and Wild 2009; Watson et al. 2002; Wild et al. 2007; Hoggett et al. 2006) to 
capture differences in disclosure patterns. There are five key sub-categories of ratios 
examined:. Share Market Measure (SMM), Profitability (PROF), Capital Structure (CS), 
Liquidity (LIQ) and Cash Flow (CF). 
The provision of relevant and imperative views that reflect companies' performance is in line 
with government initiatives in promoting Australia as a promising business destination. 
Besides having economic strength which ranked among the 20 largest in the world 
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australia 2008), Australia also rated fourth in the 
2009 Global Corporate Governance ratings (Governance Metrics International 2009). In 
addition, sophisticated information facilities and financial services offered to investors is 
another form of support provided by the Australian government. Austrade, the Australian 
Trade Commission, was created to assist international companies to develop trade and 
investment connections with Australia. 
In balancing all incentives and support initiated by the government, it is now the companies' 
task to accomplish their role in promoting Australian companies to the potential investors, 
both locally and internationally. One possible way in promoting companies' strong financial 
position is to disclose financial ratios in annual reports. Communicating this simple and quick 
tool possibly will be able to attract investors' attention to seek detail information. 
The establishment of relationship between ownership concentration and financial ratio 
communication within Australian annual reports is important due to several factors. The 
Australian Securities Exchange (2008) conducted a study examining the attitudes, knowledge 
and behaviour of retail share market investors in Australia. From the survey, they find that 
6.7 million people or 41% of Australian adults (1 8 years and above) are involved in the share 
market, a decrease from 55% and 46% in 2004 and 2006 respectively. In comparison, the 
percentage is 45% in the U.S, 21% in Switzerland, 18% in the U.K and Sweden, and 14% in 
Germany. These figures imply that the share ownership in Australia is a significant issue. 
Further, in relation to the investor' education background, the ASX's study evidence that 
46% and 42% of post graduates and degree holder respectively owned shares in 2008, with 
46% of them having more than $100,000 household income. However, 46% of the direct 
investors are perceived not to be very knowledgeable, with only 5% rated they are 
knowledgeable. It seems that half of Australian investors are non-sophisticated participants. 
Thus providing them analysis tool like financial ratios possibly enhances their understanding. 
As suggested by Smith and Taffler (1992), sophisticated users are more likely to understand 
accounting language compared to unsophisticated users. 
In a different study, Smith and Smith (1971) link the communication theory with the financial 
reporting function, specifically in relation to notes to the accounts. They find that notes to the 
financial statements are only understandable by certain groups of sophisticated readers. There 
is evidence that less than 20% of the U. S. adult population having sufficient education to 
understand this information. Chang et al. (1983) surveys 4000 individual investors, 900 
institutional investors and 900 financial analysts in the U.S., UK and New Zealand. They 
conclude that financial statement considered as most important source of information. 
However, sophisticated users (institutional investors and financial analyst) rank financial 
statements as more important than non-sophisticated users (individual investors). 
In relation to financial ratio disclosures, Watson et al. (2002) argues that the financial ratio 
information is valuable to financial statements users in providing a useful tool to assess and 
compare a company's performance. The disclosure of financial ratio can be viewed as a new 
information or readily available old information. They assumed that it does not matter 
whether the ratio is new or old information; thus they considered disclosure of all ratios. In 
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fact, they argue that the inclusion of old items possibly aid users understanding, provides 
economies on their time and reduces cost of obtaining information elsewhere. In Australia 
particularly, there are two recent studies carried out. Mitchell (2006) uses early 1990s data 
including the voluntarily earnings per share ratio because it was not mandated during that 
period. Applying signalling theory, the findings of this research suggest that companies 
selectively communicate financial ratio that is favourable. On the other hand, Morton and 
Hamson (2009) utilise a different perspective of measuring financial ratio disclosure. They 
calculate the level of disclosure using content analysis based on number of pages taken up by 
any disclosure of financial ratio. 
Lacking of discussion on the users sophistication in previous research leads this study with 
the aim to link ownership concentration and financial ratio disclosures on the basis that 
Australian investors are semi-sophisticated users. They need to be communicated with not so- 
called complex and technical information about firms' financial condition. Possible 
understanding of financial ratios maybe more vital and relevant for them than an 
understanding of greater detail of accounting jargon and reporting principles. Thus, this study 
aims to answer the following question: 
Is ownership concentration a determinant o f  the extent offinancial ratio disclosure in 
Australia? 
2.0 THEORETICAL POSITION AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Many studies in the past examine the association between the financial reporting practices 
with agency theory (Taylor et al. 2008; Barako et al. 2006; Lakhal 2005; Ho and Wong 
_ 2001). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest a possible conflict arises when agents perform 
their duties on behalf of the principals. Agents (managers) are expected to act and make 
decision to the best interest of principals (shareholders). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) outline three components of agency cost: monitoring cost, 
bonding costs and a residual loss. Monitoring costs are exercised by the principals to monitor 
the agents' behaviour in aligning their interest, such as audit fees. On the other hand, bonding 
costs are incurred by the agents themselves to bond their actions, so that is in line with 
principals' concern. Cost of financial reporting is an example of bonding cost to ensure the 
principal are informed about agents' decisions and actions. Further, any misalignment of 
interests between agents and principals possibly would incur a residual loss. 
One possible problem with conflicting agency relationship is information asymmetry. This is 
the situation where the agents have great advantages in possessing and utilising inside 
information for their own benefit than the principals. This situation occurs because the 
managers are dealing with day to day operations of the firms and they have the first hand 
information, whether good or bad, especially about the company. In reducing the information 
asymmetry problem, voluntary disclosure as defined by Meek et al. (1995, p. 555) as 
"disclosure in excess of requirements-represent free choices on the part of company 
managements to provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision 
need of users of their annual reports" might be useful. It is argued that by disclosing 
voluntary information to users, the information asymmetry problem is reduced (Healy and 
Palepu 200 1 ). 
A number of prior studies have investigated various determinants of companies' voluntary 
disclosure practices. For example, studies conducted in the US (Leftwich et al. 198 1 ; Botosan 
1997); US, UK and Continental Europe (Meek et al. 1995); Australia (McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe 1993; Singh and Mitchell Van der Zahn 2008; Guthrie et al. 2006; White et al. 
2007); New Zealand (Whiting and Miller 2008; Hackston and Milne 1996; McNally et al. 
1982); Hong Kong (Leung and Horwitz 2004; Gul and Leung 2004; Ho and Wong 2001) and 
Malaysia (Hossain et al. 1994; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman 2006) 
provide empirical evidence on various aspects of voluntary disclosure. 
However, limited focus has been given to the unique voluntary disclosure of financial ratio 
by previous researchers (Morton and Harrison 2009; Mitchell 2006; Watson et al. 2002; 
Courtis 1996; Horrigan 1965). The examination of this specific voluntary disclosure aspect is 
believed essential in gaining insights of the determinants of such disclosure practices. Thus, 
this study aims to contribute to the accounting knowledge by filling the gap of previous 
studies. 
A financial ratio is defined as a mathematical relation between two quantities (Subramanyam 
and Wild 2009). Financial ratio analysis is useful for several reasons: providing insights of 
the underlying firms' financial condition (Subramanyam and Wild 2009), a signalling tool 
(Mitchell 2006), accessing and comparing company's performance (Watson et al. 2002) and 
serving as an alternative to possible misleading influence of the absolute dollar figures 
(Courtis 1996). In addition, financial ratios are used in predictive studies (Altman 1968; 
Beaver 1966; Neophytou and Molinero 2004). 
The disclosure of financial ratios in the annual reports is driven by several motives. First, the 
disclosures can enhance the understanding of stakeholders by providing them a quick and 
simple tool highlighting the firms7 performance. Assessment of firm performance can be 
further enhanced if the ratio data is presented using graphs or tables (Courtis 1996) that 
depict changes over time. Secondly, communicating financial ratio information can provide 
users of financial statements with new information that is not comprehensively presented in 
any single media (Watson et al. 2002). This information would be more meaningful for non- 
sophisticated users in evaluating and making informed investment decisions. 
Further, some ratios are not possible to be calculated by readers because of the non- 
availability of inside information (Gibson 1982). Therefore, providing ratios such as account 
receivables turnover in the annual report could offer important insights of firms7 financial 
health position to stakeholders. Alternatively, disclosure of financial ratios would efficiently 
reduce the time and cost of obtaining and processing information (Watson et al. 2002) 
elsewhere. Graham et al. (2005) suggests that among the reasons why companies choose to 
provide voluntary information is the reduction of the cost of capital and to provide important 
information to investors that is not included in the mandatory financial statements. Arguably, 
when company disclose financial ratio in the annual report, the management is 
communicating the importance of financial ratio information to be provided to the 
stakeholders. By providing such voluntary disclosure, managers must believe that the benefits 
outweigh its cost (Watson et al. 2002). 
Study conducted by Morton and Harrison (2009) uses the annual reports preceding and after 
the introduction of IFRS in Australia. However, their study finds very similar results for both 
periods. It appears that the decision of communicating financial ratio in the annual reports is 
consistent between years. In line with this finding, the current study only considers the 
reporting of financial ratio in the 2007 annual reports. The 2007 is chosen to respond the 
suggestion by Mitchell (2006) to carry out study with more recent time period. 
Watson et al. (2002) investigates the accounting ratios in the top 313 firms in the U.K. 
Dichotomous measure is used to examine the level of disclosure of five major categories. 
However, no specific ratios are discussed in their paper. Similarly, Morton and Harrison 
(2009) did not investigate specific ratios i.n their study. They only discuss the exclusion of 
earnings and dividend per share ratios. On the other hand, Mitchell (2006) explains ten 
specific ratios examined in his study, classify into five major categories. This limited number 
of ratios might not reflect the real state of financial statement analysis studies. Hence, the 
current study aims to provide insight on the disclosure of more comprehensive financial ratio, 
by developing a disclosure index consisting of 43 ratios, which has been extensively 
discussed by seminal authors. 
In addition, all the three studies discuss the importance of the financial ratio communication 
in the annual reports. Morton and Hamson (2009) raise a question of why companies' still 
disclose ratios in their annual reports, despite the easiness of calculation and availability of 
sources of similar information. Watson et al. (2002) argues even the ratio is available 
elsewhere, the provision of this old or readily information in the annual reports might 
enhance the understandability of users. While Mitchell (2006) posits that the communication 
of financial ratio in the annual reports is to signal companies' favourable performance and 
thus attract users' attention. However, none of these studies provide a discussion from the 
view point of users' sophistication. This issue is critically important because the aim of 
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financial reporting is to assist users in making informed investment decision. Therefore, this 
study is conducted to highlight the research gap discussed above. 
The significant role of ownership concentration in influencing financial disclosure practices 
is clearly evident in previous studies worldwide (Eng and Mak 2003; Haniffa and Cooke 
2002; Chau and Gray 2002; Hossain et al. 1994). It is argued that agency problems may be 
reduced in companies with a more concentrated ownership structure and suggests that firms 
with higher concentration of ownership structure may disclose less information to 
shareholders. Chau and Gray (2002), Lakhal (2005), Oliveira et al. (2006) and Hossain et al. 
(1994) find a negative relationship between share ownership concentration and voluntary 
disclosures in a variety of countries including Hong Kong, Singapore, France, Portugal and 
Malaysia. Mitchell (2006) advocates that firms with dispersed shareholding more likely 
having higher costs of equity, and therefore have greater incentives to disclose. He suggests 
reporting of financial ratios highlights critical relationships and reduces the costs associated 
with high shareholder dispersion. It is thus expected that ownership concentration influences 
the voluntary disclosure of financial ratio. Overall, the preceding discussions led to the 
following hypothesis: 
HI: The extent of Jinancial ratio disclosures (EFRD) is negatively associated to the 
ownership concentration 
3.0 EMPIRICAL TESTS 
3.1 Sample selection 
A sample of 300 firms listed on Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) is stratified randomly 
selected. 75 companies are selected from each of four major industry classifications: 
Resources, Manufacturing, Services and Financials. The 2007 annual reports are then 
gathered and analysed. The 2007 annual report is chosen because it represents the period after 
the adoption of International Financial reporting Standards (IFRS) in Australia which aims to 
enhancing the quality of reporting. This period also exhibits the post-implementation of 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) focusing on how to strengthen the 
financial reporting framework. 
3.2 Measurement of variables 
In testing the hypothesis, various determinants of financial disclosure practices, as suggested 
by theory and confirmed in prior papers, are controlled for. These are discussed in this 
section. 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable of this study is the Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosures (EFRD). 
EFRD is the proxy to measure the extensiveness of financial ratio disclosures in companies7 
annual reports. A disclosure index comprising 43 item of ratios most commonly discussed by 
seminal authors (Hoggett et al. 2006; Horngren et al. 2006; Hoskin 1994; Maxwell et al. 
1998; Mitchell 2006; Peirson and Ramsay 2000; Stickney et al. 2004; Subramanyam and 
Wild 2009; Watson et al. 2002) is developed (see Appendix 1). The ratios are then 
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categorised into five major categories- Share Market Measure (SMM), Pro$tability (PROF), 
Capital Structure (CS), Liquidity (LIQ) and Cash Flow (CF) ratios. Earnings per share (EPS) 
is excluded since it is the sole financial ratio required to be disclosed by the Australian 
Accounting Standards Board (AASB 2006). Each voluntarily ratio item disclosed is scored as 
one (1) if communicated in the annual report for each company; otherwise zero (0). The 
EFRD scores is computed by summing up all items communicated divided by maximum 
possible number of financial ratios that could be disclosed (43). 
3.2.2 Independent variable 
Prior studies have adopted different measures of ownership concentration. For example 
Setyadi (2009) and Chen (2001) use top one; Depoers (2000) utilises top 3 while Cheung et 
al. (2008) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) measure top 5 shareholding. Studies conducted in 
Malaysia by Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetrnan (2006) calculate shareholding of top 10 shareholders. In Australia, McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe (1993); Birt et al. (2006); Mitchell (2006); Taylor et al. (2008) and Morton and 
Harrison (2009) analysed top 20 shareholding. In line with studies carried in Australia by 
previous researchers, the ownership concentration (OC) score is measured as a total 
shareholding of Top 20 shareholders. OC is treated as continuous variable by dividing 
number of shares owned by top twenty shareholders by the total number of shares issues. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Five control variables are employed: There are: Firm size (FSIZE) - natural log of total assets 
(Hossain et al. 1994; Taylor et al. 2008); Non-audit fess (NAF) - Ratio of non-audit related 
fees to total audit fees (Frankel et al. 2002; Habib and Azim 2008); Industry (IND) - Dummy 
variable for four major categories of industry - Resources, Manufacturing, Services and 
Financials (Tower et al. 1999); Profit, Loss firm (PLF) - (1 for profit firm and 0 for loss firm) 
and Audit type (AUDTYPE) - Dichotomous variable for type of auditor; 1 for Big4, 0 for 
Non-Big4 (Barako et al. 2006). 
4.0 RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the descriptive result for the EFRD and five key sub-categories. Overall, the 
communication of financial ratio in the annual reports is low. On average, the sample of 
Australian firms only communicates 5.3% of the 43 ratios investigated. The result also 
portrays two-tiers of reporting level, dominated by the first three sub-categories (Share 
Market Measures, Capital Structure and Profitability) ranging from 7.4% to 9.0%. On the 
other hand, the other two categories (Liquidity and Cash Flow) communicate less than 1% of 
ratios. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for EFRD 
Extent of Share Capital Cash 
financial ratio Market Profitability Structure Liquidity Flow 
disclosure Measures 
Mean (%) 5.3 9.0 7.4 7.9 0.9 0.2 
Median (%) 2.3 9.1 0 0 0 0 
SD (%) 5.6 9.6 10.8 12.5 4.6 1.7 
Min. (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max. (%) 30.2 36.4 55.6 57.1 42.9 22.2 
Legend: SD is standard deviation; n=300. 
Table 2 provides further evidence on the disclosure level of 43 ratios; consist of eleven (1 1) 
of Share Market Measures, nine (9) each of Profitability and Cash Flow; and seven (7) each 
of Capital Structure and Liquidity sub-categories. Overall, the communication level of the 
specific ratio can be classified into three categories: satisfactory (more than lo%), moderate 
(less than 10%); and silent (zero communication). 10% cut-off point is use because on 
average, none of the sub-category providing more than 10%. In summary: 
Satisfactory: 8 ratios with SMM(4); CS(2) and PROF( 2) 
Moderate: 24 ratios with SMM(4); CS(4); PROF(7); LIQ (6) and CF(3) 
Silent: 11 ratios with SMM(3); CS(1); LIQ(1) and CF(6) 
Figure 1 shows that out of 43 investigated ratios, 19% of them are satisfactorily 
communicated by the sample firms. More than half (56%) of the ratios are moderately 
reported and 25% of them are not communicated at all. 
Figure 1: EFRD by specific ratio 
Table 2: Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosures by Specific Ratio 
Categories (% disclosure score) Ratio 
3. Profitability (7.4%) 
4. Liquidity (0.9%) 
5. Cash Flow (0.2%) 
1. Share Market Measure 1 .Total shareholder return (TSR) 
(9.0%) 2.Net tangible assets per share (NTAB) 
3. Dividend payout 
4.Dividend yield 
5.Net assets per share (NAB) 
6,Market capitalisation 
7 .Price-to-earnings (PIE) 
8.Earnings yield 
9.Price-to-book 
10.Book value per ordinary share 
1 1 .Market-to-book ratio 
2. Capital Structure (7.9%) 1 .Gearing 
2.Times interest earned 
3 .Total debvequity 
4.Capitalisation ratio 
5 .Equity ratio 
6.Liabilitiesl Assets 
7.Long Term debtlequity 
1 .Return on equities (ROE) 
2 .EBITDAI Revenue 
3.Gross profit margin 
4.Total expenseslrevenue 
5 .Return on assets (ROA) 
6.Net profit margin 
7.Pre-tax profit margin 
8.Return on sales 
9.Sales turnover 
1 .Current ratio 
2.Inventory turnover 
3.Quick ratio 
4.Days to sell inventory 
5.Accounts receivable turnover 
6.Collection period 
7.Payment period 
1 .Operation index 
2.Cash flow adequacy 
3.Cash flow ratio 
4.Repayment long term borrowings 
5 .Dividend payment 
6 .Reinvestment 
7.Debt coverage 
8.Cash flow to revenue 




Univariate tests have been conducted to examine the relationship between EFRD and several 
categorical variables. According to Table 3, the findings indicate that the EFRD is 
significantly different between profit (with mean of 7%) and loss (with mean of 1.2%) firms. 
This result implies that profit making firms communicate more financial ratio in their annual 
reports as compared to the loss firms. In addition, the t-test analysis also confirms that firms 
audited by Big 4 audit firms (KPMG Peat Marwick, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche and 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers) report more extensive financial ratio information compared with 
non-Big4 clients. 
Table 3: T-test EFRD with Profit1 Loss Firms and Audit Firm Type 
EFRD 
N Mean Mean Difference t-stats Sig. 
( O h  1 (%I 
Profit/Loss h s  
LOSS 88 1.2 -5.8 -12.657 O.OOO* 
Profit 212 7.0 
Audit firm type 
Non-big4 108 2.4 -4.5 -8.473 O.OOO* 
Big4 192 6.9 
Legend: *,**,*** Highly significant at the 0.01 level, Significant at the 0.05 level, Moderately significant at the 
0.1 level respectively (2-tailed); EFRD is Extent of financial ratio disclosure; Big4 audit firms are KPMG Peat 
Marwick, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche and PriceWaterhouse Coopers; Non-big4 audit firms are all others 
An ANOVA test is carried out to ascertain the association between EFRD and industry 
sectors. As shown in Table 4, Resources sector communicates the least EFRD (mean of 
3.1%), while Manufacturing, Services and Financials sectors provide almost double EFRD 
than Resources. A further Tukey HSD test confirms Resources sectors reports significantly 
lower EFRD than Services and Financial firms. 




N Mean (%) F 
Industry 6.706 
Resources 75 3.1 
Manufacturing 75 5.1 
Services 75 6.1 
Financials 75 6.9 
Legend: *,**,*** Highly significant at the 0.01 level, Significant at the 0.05 level, Moderately significant at the 
0.1 level respectively (2-tailed); EFRD is Extent of financial ratio disclosure; Industry4 are the four major 
categories of industry (Tower et al., 1999) namely Resources, Manufacturing, Services and Financials. 
Table 5 displays the correlation matrix between EFRD and predictors variables. EFRD 
appears to be not associated with ownership concentration. However, several control 
variables such as firm size, industry, profitlloss firms and type of auditors are related to 
EFRD for both Pearson and Spearman correlations. As the correlation coefficients between 
the variables is below critical limit of 0.80 (Hair et al. 2006), the multicolinearity is not a 
concern of this study. 
Table 5: Correlations between dependent, independent and control variables 
EFRD OC FSIZE NAF IND PLF AUDTYPE 
EFRD 1 -.003 .625* -.035 .246* .477* .387* 
OC .011 1 .088 .129** .027 .184* .082 
FSIZE .635* .132** 1 .175* .2 1 ** .52** .49** 
NAF .066 .127** .230* 1 -.011 .091 .2 1 ** 
IND .261* .021 .190* -.008 1 .36** .019 
PLF .554* .186* .555* .121** .360* 1 .27** 
AUDTYPE .397* .087 .518* .224* .019 .279* 1 
Legend: *, **, *** Correlation is hghly significant at the 0.01 level, significant at the 0.05 level, moderately 
significant at the 0.1 level respectively (2-tailed); EFRD= Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosure; OC= Ownership 
Concentration; FSIZE= Firm Size; NAF= Non audit fees, IND= Industry; PLF= Profit1 Loss Firms, 
AUDTYPE= Big4nonBig4 
Table 6 presents the multiple regressions finding for the dependent variable (EFRD) and the 
possible predictor variables. The result reveals that the model is statistically significant (1 %) 
with F-value of 42.083. The adjusted R' is 0.452, indicating that 45.2% of the variation in the 
EFRD can be explained by the model. 
Table 6: Multiple Regression Results for EFRD 




Variables Coefficients t-stat P-value 
Intercept -0.161 -6.974 O.OOO* 
OC -0.024 -1.665 0.095*** 
FSIZE 0.01 1 8.451 O.OOO* 
NAF -0.036 -3.472 0.001 * 
PLF 0.023 3.555 O.OOO* 
IND 0.04 1.535 0.126 
AUDTYPE 0.016 2.665 0.008** 
Legend: *,**,*** Highly significant at the 0.01 level, Significant at the 0.05 level, Moderately significant at the 
0.1 level respectively; 1-tailed and 2-tailed test is used for directional and non-directional association 
respectively; EFRD is Extent of financial ratio disclosures; OC is Ownership concentration; FSIZE is Firm size; 
NAF is Non-audit fees; PLF is Profit1 loss firm; IND is Industry; AUDTYPE is type of auditor (Big4- 
NonBig4). 
The regression result confirms that ownership concentration has a moderate and significant 
(p-value < 10%) association with EFRD as expected. It seems that companies with more 
dispersed shareholding communicate more financial ratio in the annual reports. Thus, HI is 
supported. This result is consistent with Mitchell (2006). In addition, several control variables 
also contribute valuable insights on the reporting policy of financial ratio. Firm size, auditors' 
independence (measures as NAF) and profitlloss firms are highly significant (p-value < 1%) 
predictors in determining the level of FRDs. The results indicate that profitable and larger 
firms; with more independent auditors disclose more financial ratio information. Lastly, the 
type of auditor (Big4 versus Non-Big4) also significantly influences the firms' decision to 
report financial ratio. Consistent with univariate tests, Big4 clients present more financial 
ratios than their counterparts in the annual reports. However, this study fails to provide 
evidence to impact of industry sectors on the EFRD. 
5.0 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study provides a cross sectional evaluation of the extent of financial ratio disclosures 
(EFRD) within the 2007 annual reports of 300 Australian listed firms. The examination of 
EFRD and its five key sub-categories is based on the 43-items disclosure checklist. The 
findings show the level of EFRD is low in absolute figure. On average, companies only 
communicate 5.3% of the 43 financial ratios examined in this study. Possible reasons 
explaining this situation is that management of the company may feel that the financial ratio 
is not a critical issue to be addressed in the annual reports. On the other hand, financial ratio 
could be easily calculated by anybody with some basic knowledge. Thus, provision of 
financial ratios in the annual reports might do not add values to the readers. Further, financial 
analyst also could provide the financial ratios that relevant and important to potential 
investors. Again, the communication of this information in the annual reports seems less 
important. As suggested by Raja Ahrnad (2009), possible reasons for non-communication of 
corporate philanthropic donations include: no giving, materiality, strategic motive, charitable 
exhaustion, fear of shareholders anger, hiding pet charities, expectation gap, cost benefit, no 
mandatory requirement and absence of clear reporting guideline. 
The findings also suggest that Share Market Measure, Capital Structure and Profitability 
sub-categories are the most popular categories of ratio communicated in the annual reports. 
Share Market Measure sub-category consists of eleven ratios that related to the share market 
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environment generally. Most of the ratios under this category utilised share market 
information such share price and number of shares issued. On the other hand, Capital 
Structure sub-category consists of eight ratios, which dealing with sources of capital such as 
debt and equity of the firms. Profitability sub-category represents the ratios that measure the 
level of profitability of the firms. It focuses on the revenues and profit level and nine ratios 
are included in this sub-category. 
One possible reason for the situation is that these categories are directly related to the 
stakeholders such as shareholders and future investors (Watson et al. 2002; Mitchell 2006). 
These categories of ratios portray the performance of the firm and how efficient the firm's 
managing their sources of capital. These are among important and useful elements in making 
investment and evaluation decisions. Another reason is that these ratios have been ranked as 
important ratios, either by the users or the preparers in the previous studies. From the users' 
point of view, Al-Ajmi (2008) surveys the perceptions of credit and financial analysts of the 
usefulness financial ratios. Both credit analysts and financial analysts rank cash flow based 
ratios lower than non-cash-based ratios. It appears that investors consider the information in 
the cash flow statement as less important in comparison with the balance sheet and the 
income statement. 
In addition, Whittred and Zimmer (1986) and Cotter (1998) note that leverage and interest 
cover are the most commonly used covenants in public and private debt contracts. Hence, 
maintaining these ratios are important in ensuring companies continuously having sufficient 
funds. By providing these financial ratios in the annual reports, it appears that company 
believe that these ratios are important to be communicated to the shareholders. Overall, it can 
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be concluded that the level of financial ratio in Australian annual reports is consider low. The 
level of disclosure also varies among individual ratio, and similar patterns also observed 
among the five key sub-categories of financial ratio. The findings are consistent with the 
previous studies and several possible reasons leading to this situation are identified. 
Ownership concentration is a possible variable tested in this study to examine the level of 
EFRD. The statistical results reveal that there is a negative and moderate association between 
the ownership concentration and the EFRD. It appears that voluntary disclosure of financial 
ratios mitigates the agency problems when the company has dispersed shareholding. This 
results is consistent with prior study like McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) in Australia, 
Hossain, Tan, and Adams (1994) in Malaysia, Lakhal (2005) in France and Oliveira, 
Rodrigues, and Craig (2006) in Portugal. 
In addition, ASX (2006) notes Australian shareholders owning more overseas shares, 
increasing the number of companies held in a portfolio, having more mixture of large and 
small companies in their portfolio and increasing the number of shares bought and sold in 
2006 as compared to previous years. Having actively involved in share market possibly 
motivates them seeking important and relevant information such as financial ratios in making 
informed investment decisions. 
As a control variable, firm size is found positively and significantly correlated with EFRD. In 
regression analysis, firm size also has positive and significant association with EFRD. There 
are several possible reasons contributing to this result. Higher political visibility as argued by 
agency theory is one of possible reason by bigger companies provide more financial ratios in 
their annual reports. In addition, bigger firms appear to have higher agency cost, and by 
providing free financial ratios in their annual reports possibly could lower the agency 
problems. Other possible reason is that bigger firm normally have better disclosure practices 
because they have lower cost accumulating information and they realised the benefit they 
could gain if providing relevant information like financial ratios to the readers. Bigger firms 
also provide more financial ratios because they need greater financing. By providing the 
relevant information, possibly they could attract the potential investors. This result is 
consistent with previous studies such as Ho and Wong (2001), Watson et a!. (2002), Gul and 
Leung (2004), Wallace et al. (1 994), Hossain et al. (1 994) and Singhvi and Desai (1 97 1). 
The next control variable utilised is non-audit fees (NAF), which represents the total of non- 
audit fees to the total of audit fees. This variable measures the independence of company's 
auditor while providing audit services and non-audit services at the same time. Both 
regression results indicate that the more independent the auditor, the more financial ratios 
with higher quality provided in the annual reports. One possible reason leading to this 
situation is that more independent auditors possibly would advice firms to provide more and 
better quality of financial ratios because they are aware the benefits and usefulness of the 
tool. 
Another audit-related variable tested is auditor type (AUDTYPE), classified as Big4 and non- 
Big4 audit firms. Both univariate and multivariate tests reveal that companies audited by 
Big4 audit firms provide more financial ratios. One possible reason is that Big4 audit firms is 
providing quality services in providing advice and suggestions to their clients in term of 
providing relevant and important information to stakeholders. 
Profit1 loss firms (PLF) classified companies into profit making or loss firms for the year. The 
results show that this variable is a significant predictor for both univariate and multivariate 
analysis for EFRD. It appears that profit firms provide more financial ratios in their annual 
reports. One possible reason is that they wanted to show that they are performed well, and 
trying to attract potential investors in order to gain additional capital. Profit firms also could 
be associated with political visibility as suggested by agency theory. The result is consistent 
with pervious study conducted by Labelle (2002) who argues that firms with good 
performance are more likely to invest in quality disclosure. This is because profit making 
firms are better placed to invest in governance practices that can be subsequently be 
disclosed. 
The final control variable included in this study is industry (IhTD) category. The sample 
companies are classified into four major industry category including Resources, 
Manufacturing, Services and Financials. However, only univariate tests provide significant 
differences between industries in determining EFRD. The analysis shows that Financials and 
Services sectors are providing more financial ratios as compared to Resources sector. In 
contrast, Collett and Hrasky (2005) examine the relationship between a firm's decision to 
make voluntary corporate disclosures and industry classification. They find that resource 
industry firms are significantly more likely to disclose corporate governance information than 
others. 
To conclude, the findings of this study suggest the level of financial ratio disclosures in the 
Australian annual reports as low, with some exception for Share Market Measures, Capital 
Structure and Pro$tability sub-categories. The communication of 19%, 56% and 25% of the 
2 3 
43 listed ratios are considered 'satisfactory', 'moderate' and 'silent' respectively. The 
univariate tests demonstrate that profitable firms, audited by Big4 audit firms and firms 
attached to Financials industry communicate more financial ratios. Regression result 
indicates that more dispersed shareholding firms significantly linked to the EFRD. Profitable 
and bigger firms audited by independent and Big4 audit firms also found associated with the 
decision to report more extant of financial ratios. 
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